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Abstract: 
 In recent years, the Chinese public, when facing disputes with government 
officials, have preferred a non-legal means of resolution, the Xinfang system, over 
litigation.  Some scholars explain this by claiming that administrative litigation is less 
effective than Xinfang petitioning, while others argue that the Chinese have historically 
eschewed litigation and continue to do so habitually.  A closer examination of 
contemporary and historical data indicates that both explanations are questionable: 
Xinfang petitioning is, in fact, much less effective than litigation, and very rarely solves 
the petitioner's problem.  On the other hand, traditional Chinese societies, particularly 
those in the Qing and Republican eras, do not display significant anti-litigation 
tendencies.  This paper proposes a new explanation: Chinese have traditionally litigated 
administrative disputes, but only when legal procedure is not overly adversarial and 
allows for the possibility of reconciliation through court-directed settlement.  Because 
this possibility does not formally exist in modern Chinese administrative litigation, 
people tend to avoid it. 
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 3 
Introduction 
 In recent years, the innocuously named Ningxiang County (literally: “Peaceful 
County”), located in China’s Hunan Province, has been wracked by a series of widely 
publicized popular protests against government taxation and corruption.
1
  The unrest 
started in June 1998, when local people staged a peaceful demonstration in Daolin town 
against a number of administrative fees imposed by local authorities.  A second 
demonstration, held on January 8, 1999, led to more severe consequences.  A large clash 
between several thousand demonstrators and local government forces killed one peasant 
and wounded several others.  Hardened by this tragedy, the protestors decided to seek 
higher official support for their grievances.  Ignoring the judicial system, they filed 
petitions to the Xinfang (literally: “Letters and Visits”), or complaints, office of 
Changsha, the provincial capital, and later to various Xinfang offices in Beijing.  In the 
meantime, both domestic newspapers and the New York Times began to report on the 
petitions, creating hope that authorities would cave in to media pressure.  The 
government response, however, was mixed: the family of the victim received 60,000 
Yuan (about $7500) in compensation, but nine organizers of the rallies were arrested in 
August and sentenced to terms from two to six years.  The original goal of the 
demonstrations, to curb over-taxation and unreasonable fees, was not addressed. 
 The filings of most administrative grievances in China do not closely resemble 
Ningxiang’s experience: they often involve fewer people and less tragic circumstances 
and, of course, rarely receive attention from the New York Times.
2
  Nonetheless, the 
Ningxiang petitions were typical of recent (1996 to 2004) administrative grievance cases 
in some very important ways.  First, the petitioners never initiated any kind of judicial 
litigation, instead preferring the less-formal Xinfang system.  This is probably quite 
surprising to many western lawyers who are unfamiliar with China’s legal system.  In the 
United States, England, and France, for example, administrative complaints against 
government corruption and abuse frequently end up in usual courts of law or in 
specialized administrative courts.  China’s administrative litigation procedure, on the 
other hand, remains largely ignored even after eighteen years of existence.  This would be 
less troublesome if the alternative, and much more popular, option, the Xinfang system, 
yielded a higher rate of success for petitioners.  But here, too, the Ningxiang experience 
was typical: the petitioners did not solve their problem. 
 China’s rather peculiar system of Xinfang was established in the early 1950s as a 
general-governance tool.  Official regulations demand that all kinds of government 
branches, including administrative, legislative and judicial organs at all levels, establish 
Xinfang offices that are open to the public.  These offices then receive complaints, 
suggestions, and requests from the general population through either letters (“Xin”) or in-
person visits (“Fang”), hence their name.  Since how they handle these petitions is not 
expressly regulated by any document or law, these offices are clearly distinct from 
judicial organs.  To this day, the official Xinfang regulations issued by the State Council 
theoretically allow people to present petitions and comments on virtually any aspect of 
social life: wages, contracts, access to public services, and even weddings.
3
  In more 
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recent years, however, Xinfang petitions have converged on two main categories: appeals 
of judicial decisions and administrative grievances against various government organs.  
As I will argue, available statistics suggest that the vast majority of petitions in the former 
category involve civil, not administrative, disputes.  Existing studies also agree that the 
latter category, administrative grievances against the government, accounts for most other 
petitions, to the extent that one scholar habitually referred to the Xinfang system as an 
“administrative process[] for promoting administrative accountability.”4  While many, 
probably most, administrative grievances filed with the Xinfang offices can also be 
resolved through judicial litigation, people very rarely go to court.  Indeed, some 
estimates based on available statistics reasonably suggest that there were perhaps four or 
five million administrative Xinfang petitions a year during the 1996-2004 period, but 
only around one hundred thousand administrative complaints filed with the courts.  Even 
a more conservative estimate would have to agree that the Xinfang system is used far 
more frequently.  This paper attempts to explain why. 
 Existing studies on China’s Xinfang system typically pin its virtual monopoly 
over administrative dispute resolution on two reasons.  First, some argue that China’s 
administrative litigation system is so ineffective and corrupted that people have no better 
option than the Xinfang offices.
5
  Second, several scholars have also blamed China’s 
historical tradition: Chinese people, they argue, have a long history, extending back to at 
least the Qing Dynasty, of utilizing non-legal means to resolve administrative grievances 
and continue to do so out of cultural habit.
6
  In addition, at least one scholar has 
suggested that China’s more recent Communist history can also help explain this anti-
legal path-dependency.
7
  Of course, the “judicial inefficiency” explanation and the “anti-
legal tradition” explanation, if we may call them by those names in this paper, are not 
mutually exclusive.  A number of scholars have, indeed, made both.
8
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 This paper argues that a more comprehensive analysis of contemporary and 
historical data indicates that both existing explanations are questionable.  The more 
popular “judicial inefficiency” thesis contradicts a large body of evidence indicating that 
judicial litigation, for all its problems, gives petitioners a much higher chance of success 
than the opaque and unpredictable Xinfang system.  There is also little evidence to 
suggest that petitioners have been misinformed or possess an incorrectly low opinion of 
the courts.  In addition, while some scholars have suggested that the Xinfang system’s 
popularity is due to its ability to provide the public with a means of political 
participation,
9
 this hypothesis is unfounded: existing evidence suggests that the vast 
majority of Xinfang petitioners use the system for dispute-settlement, not to satisfy any 
psychological need to participate in policy-making.   
As for the “anti-legal tradition” thesis, its proponents simply have their history 
wrong: First, the system that they consider the Qing equivalent of Xinfang, the “Jing 
Kong” (“Capital Appeals”) process, was, in fact, a judicial system.  Moreover, judicial 
litigation was probably the most prevalent means of addressing administrative grievances 
in the Qing, even though institutions that more closely resembled the Xinfang system did 
exist.  Moreover, available statistics concerning the use of Xinfang and administrative 
litigation in the Communist era suggest that a “habitual reliance on earlier Communist 
institutions” explanation is also inadequate.  It does not fit into the history of the Xinfang 
system, and cannot explain why the use of judicial litigation rose rapidly after it became 
available, even as Xinfang petitions were decreasing in number, but then began to decline 
at the same time that Xinfang petitions began to increase. 
 In place of these existing explanations, I will propose a new and more subtle 
theory: the Chinese public dislikes administrative litigation because it uses procedures 
that are unfamiliar to them.  In other words, it is not that they are unaccustomed to using 
law in administrative disputes, but only that they are unaccustomed to some law.  A 
comparison of China’s current administrative litigation system with its more successful 
civil litigation system and with Qing legal traditions suggests that the source of people’s 
discomfort is very likely the more adversarial nature of modern administrative litigation.  
This largely stems from the administrative litigation law’s prohibition of mediation in 
administrative cases and its requirement that all suits receive a public trial.  The Chinese 
public seems to both expect and prefer that its lawsuits, whether civil or administrative, 
adopt more paternalistic and less confrontational methods, if only in appearance: the 
judge should appear as a benevolent “Fu Mu Guan” (“father figure”) who is seeking to 
solve problems through the least intrusive way possible, not a cold arbitrator between two 
adversaries.  The fact that the people are facing government officials in administrative 
litigation probably makes the lack of mediation seem even less desirable.  Thus, the 
heightened adversarial nature of modern Chinese administrative litigation may very well 
deter people from filing their complaints with the judiciary.  In comparison, the opacity 
of the Xinfang system and its noble rhetoric of “serving the people” probably seem much 
more comfortable, even though its non-legal nature causes more ambiguity and decreases 
accountability.  This theory is, of course, ultimately based on historical analysis, but its 
use of history is hopefully more accurate than previous “anti-legal tradition” explanations. 
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 Due to the lack of statistical data and appropriately crafted surveys, there is no 
way to directly prove this thesis by tapping the minds of petitioners.  Nonetheless, since it 
readily agrees with existing evidence even as other conceivable explanations lead to 
sharp contradictions and problems, there is good reason to believe that it is correct.  In 
any case, the length of this paper places many limitations on the depth of our analysis (for 
example, there is an obvious comparative angle with the “adversarial legalism,”10 to use 
Robert Kagan’s phrase, of the United States).  A full study would likely take years of 
field research and end up book-length.  This paper only seeks to comprehensively survey 
the existing data and academic literature and, upon that, propose a potentially more 
rewarding theory for future study.  It has, I hope, much to offer.  Apart from presenting a 
clearer picture of the numerical trends than has been done before, its criticism of the 
“judicial inefficiency” explanation is, to my knowledge, more systematic and thorough 
than previous scholarship, while the conclusions of its historical analysis are new, at least 
in the Xinfang context.  
 One important qualification must be made.  Given the significant cultural, 
economic and social differences between different areas of China, what is true in the rural 
areas, where much of my data and discussion is focused, is not necessarily true of the 
major cities.  For that matter, what is true in central China may be grossly wrong when 
applied to Guangdong.  Xinfang petitioning might actually be more effective than 
litigation in a number of areas, and the causes of its popularity might vary from region to 
region.  Nonetheless, this paper attempts to use national statistics and data whenever 
possible and avoids projecting local samples onto the national scale without careful 
comparison with other national statistics.  In addition, while Chinese society varies 
geographically, its legal system and government bureaucracy is considerably more 
uniform and, after many centuries of centralized political unification,
11
 it does make 
sense to speak of Chinese society as a somewhat homogeneous whole, although with 
emphasis on the “somewhat.”  In any case, the explanations that I examine, criticize and 
advocate here are all attempts to theorize on the national scale.  Thus, it is important to 
remember that these claims and conclusions, many of which have existed in academic 
circles for a long time, are all approximations when applied to the local level, and are 
probably better approximations in some geographical areas than others.  Since this paper 
is presented as a reasoned proposal of a new theory, and not as a conclusive proof of it, it 
leaves open the possibility of future research that focuses more specifically and carefully 
on certain localities. 
 The paper is separated into four parts.  Part One gives a basic description of the 
Xinfang and administrative litigation systems, using available statistics to outline how 
frequently they are used, and for what kinds of disputes.  Existing scholarship has yet to 
describe the dramatic numerical contrast between Xinfang petitions and formal 
administrative litigation requests in clear terms, and this part seeks to fill in that void.  
Part Two refutes the “judicial inefficiency” explanation and a few other potential 
explanations that seem plausible at first, but can be straightforwardly debunked through 
statistical analysis.  Part Three refutes all currently existent forms of the “anti-legal 
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tradition” explanation, examining how administrative disputes were settled in both the 
Qing and early Communist eras.  Part Four proposes my own explanation and examines 
its validity in light of historical and contemporary evidence.  A short conclusion follows. 
 
Part One: Overview 
 State Council regulations dictate the establishment of Xinfang offices at all levels 
of government.
12
  The most recent version of these regulations was issued in 2005, which 
only made cosmetic changes to the 1996 edition.
13
  They lay the basic groundwork for the 
Xinfang system, although local governments may provide their own, more detailed, 
regulations.  According to the State Council, Xinfang offices exist so that “citizens, legal 
persons and other organizations” may “report situations or submit opinions, proposals or 
requests to the people’s governments at various levels or departments of the people’s 
governments at and above the county level” through “letters, telephone or personal 
appearance.”14  The offices thus maintain a “governance link” between the government 
and the masses.
15
  In a non-democratic country, the existence of such a link obviously 
plays an important part in the government’s political legitimacy.16 
Xinfang offices now populate the entire spectrum of Chinese government, taking 
more than 10 million cases each year.
17
  Technically, the regulations permit them to 
handle virtually any kind of problem.  These include four general categories: any 
“criticisms, proposals or requests for an administrative authority or its staff,” accusations 
that expose “violations of laws or negligence by the staff of administrative authorities,” 
“complaints against an infringement of the rights or interests of the complainant,” or, in 
the famously hazy language that Chinese laws and regulations often use, “other 
matters.” 18   Since the two unambiguously defined categories, “violations” and 
“complaints,” both expressly deal with administrative misconduct, we can reasonably 
assume that the Xinfang system was mainly intended to be, in the words of Michael 
Palmer, an “administrative process[] for promoting administrative accountability.” 19  
Nonetheless, the other two vaguely worded categories technically allow for petitions that 
have nothing to do with administrative grievances.  Such petitions were especially 
common in earlier decades.  In 1996, for example, a complaint office in Tianjin reported 
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a barrage of citizen complaints about the need for regulations for an open-air market in 
the residential area.
20
  A more bizarre report came from Guangdong Province, where 
Xinfang officials reported that one of their “big cases” in 1984 was helping an anxious 
groom procure a place to hold his wedding ceremony.
21
 
 In recent years, however, Xinfang petitions seem to have converged on two less 
innocuous categories: appeals of judicial decisions (“she su shang fang”) and 
administrative grievances against the government.  While official Xinfang statistics are 
frustratingly scarce and frequently imprecise,
22
 the prevalence of such petitions is 
unmistakable.  In 2003, for example, around 40% of all Xinfang cases appealed the 
results of previous litigation, a number that was consistent with previous and later 
years.
23
  These two main categories seem to have very little overlap.  While there are no 
nation-wide statistics, a few counties do keep detailed records on the nature of litigation-
related petitions.  One such county reported that roughly 2% to 5% of litigation-related 
Xinfang petitions stemmed from administrative litigation, while the rest originated from 
criminal prosecution or civil disputes.
24
  This figure makes sense on the national level too, 
as there are about 4 to 5 million “litigation-related” (“she su”) Xinfang petitions a year, 
but only 100,000 administrative litigation cases. 
25
   
On the other hand, administrative disputes clearly constitute a very large portion 
of all Xinfang petitions: a 1996 report claimed that “concerns about clean government 
and cadre work style” alone constituted one third of all Xinfang petitions,26 and there is 
good reason to suspect that this number has been even higher in more recent years.  For 
example, in a 2004 survey of Xinfang petitioners, 87% of respondents claimed that their 
grievances were related to official corruption and abuse.
27
  Even if statistically inflated, 
this nonetheless reveals the high frequency of corruption-related petitions.  But even the 
one-third figure would place the number of administrative grievance petitions at over half 
of all petitions not related to previous litigation, which, as noted, cover around 60% of all 
cases.  Indeed, since complaints about “clean government and cadre work style” are but 
one of many categories of administrative grievance petitions, which cover access to 
public services, taxation policies, and birth control, to list only a few, such petitions 
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probably account for at least 40 to 50 percent of all Xinfang cases, which would bring the 
total number of administrative Xinfang petitions to between 4 and 6 million a year.  As 
noted above, the vast majority of such petitions were brought to the Xinfang offices 
without any prior litigation. 
 Once a petitioner has filed his complaint with a Xinfang office, he or she has 
virtually no control over how the office processes his complaint.  Regulations demand 
that the office respond to all petitions it accepts within 90 days, but do not set forth any 
standard of proof, process of investigation, or transparency requirements.
28
  Although 
responses must be in writing, there are no rules concerning what should actually be 
written, so offices are free to be as ambiguous as they like.
29
  The vagueness of this 
decision-making process makes appeals to higher Xinfang offices, which are, of course, 
governed by similarly hazy regulations, highly difficult.   
The lack of meaningful standards and rules of procedure clearly differentiate the 
Xinfang system from most modern legal systems.  Moreover, a response from a Xinfang 
office only represents a government decision to either grant or refuse official aid, and 
cannot be seen as passing legal judgment on anything, even if the office is effectively 
expressing its own opinion on the legal (or administrative) validity of the petition.  
Ultimately, as one scholar put it, the system is distinctly non-legal (though not illegal, of 
course), representing “the rule of man (or Party), not the rule of law.”30  And yet, as 
argued above, over 4 million administrative grievances annually ignore judicial 
alternatives in favor of this opaque system.  The sheer scope of these numbers almost 
makes one wonder whether a judicial alternative to the Xinfang system actually exists.  
But that would be a rhetorical question.  For many, if not most, of those administrative 
grievance petitions, the answer is clearly yes. 
China’s National People’s Congress passed its Administrative Litigation Law 
(ALL) on April 4, 1989, allowing Chinese citizens, for the first time since the People’s 
Republic’s founding in 1949, to sue government officials who violated the law in the 
course of administrative activity.
31
  Prior to this, administrative disputes were largely 
settled through the Xinfang offices, but the ALL was intended to provide a more 
accountable and legitimate means of resolution.
32
  Unlike the Xinfang system, the ALL 
provided specific procedures of evidence gathering and clear standards of proof, which 
will be discussed in greater detail later on. 
Although earlier drafts of the ALL attempted to limit the number of actionable 
administrative activities,
33
 the final draft responded to academic criticism by expanding 
courts’ jurisdiction.  It allows aggrieved citizens to seek redress in eight kinds of 
circumstances: first, when they refuse to accept certain administrative penalties; second, 
when they refuse to accept compulsory administrative measures such as the seizure of 
property; third, when they believe that an administrative organ has abused its managerial 
decision-making powers; fourth, when they believe that their application for a permit or 
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license is legally valid, but has been rejected or ignored by an administrative organ; fifth, 
when an administrative organ has refused or neglected to perform a legal obligated duty; 
sixth, when they believe that an administrative organ has failed to distribute a pension; 
seventh, when they believe that an administrative organ has illegally demanded the 
performance of duties; and, eighth, when they believe that an administrative organ has 
infringed upon other rights of person and of property.
34
  Rule 12 of the ALL also defines 
three categories of administrative action that cannot be sued: issues of national defense 
and foreign relations; administrative rules, regulations, and decisions that have general 
applicability; administrative personnel decisions; and certain actions where, by law, 
administrative organs have the final say.
35
   
Clearly, these rules allow for a fairly broad range of administrative suits, covering 
corruption and abuse of power, failure to provide certain public services, and incorrect 
decisions that do not constitute an abstract regulation.  Although the Supreme People’s 
Court has interpreted the four Rule 12 exceptions to include all abstract regulations that 
apply to “an indefinite number of persons” and “can be applied multiply,”36 they do not 
include attempts to enforce them.  In some cases, courts may choose to ignore regulations 
that they consider illegal, as long as they do not actually declare them as such.
37
 
In addition to these basic categories of actionable activities, the law also 
notoriously requires the plaintiff to identify a “concrete administrative act” that led to the 
grievances.
38
  An oft-criticized 1991 provisionary Supreme People’s Court interpretation 
(whose current validity is unclear) defined this term as “a unilateral action taken by an 
administrative organ exercising administrative authority against a specific person or 
organization, which involves the rights and obligations of that person or organization.”39  
This would allow litigation over abuses of power, acts of personal corruption that have 
harmed the plaintiff’s interests, virtually any type of actual enforcement or, indeed, any 
regulation that is aimed at specific persons or organizations.  Thus, the only 
administrative actions that would be exempt are either those that have no practical impact 
outside of the government, or the establishment of abstract rules that are generally 
applicable to all.  This does not seem to be much different from the Rule 12 exceptions 
discussed above. 
While the Rule 12 exceptions and the “concrete act” requirement have proven, on 
occasion, to prevent potential litigants from going to trial,
40
 such cases do not appear to 
happen too frequently.  Based on statistics published by the Chinese judiciary, which, we 
may add, are most probably more accurate than Xinfang statistics, courts accept 75 to 80 
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percent of administrative litigation petitions filed with them.
41
  Perhaps more importantly 
for the purposes of this paper, complaints against “abstract rules” seem to constitute only 
a very small portion of administrative Xinfang petitions.
42
  Instead, as discussed above, 
these petitions generally focus on specific acts of official corruption, abuse, and 
negligence.  When administrative regulations do come into play, they generally do so as 
part of the petitioner’s legal basis: the petitioners usually claim that officials misapply the 
rules, not that the rules themselves are wrong.  This implies, of course, that many, 
probably most, administrative Xinfang petitions could also be brought to court as formal 
litigation petitions under the ALL.  The overlap, as more than one scholar has noticed, is 
substantial.
43
  
Some will surely point out that there exists an alternative to both Xinfang 
petitioning and administrative litigation: administrative reconsideration, which allows 
petitioners to challenge a administrative organ’s decision or act by filing a complaint with 
it’s direct superiors.  Unlike courts, these superiors possess the authority to review 
matters of abstract policy, and would seem to have greater expertise and competency than 
the judiciary.  While it is important to acknowledge the existence of this alternative 
mechanism, it is ultimately not one of this paper’s central concerns, as it bears no direct 
logical connection to why people prefer Xinfang petitioning over litigation.  In addition, 
administrative reconsideration is utilized even less frequently than litigation, with only 
70,000 or so filings per year,
44
 and does not seem to be a major factor in most 
administrative disputes. 
Both Xinfang petitioning and litigation occur much more frequently, although 
petitioners decidedly prefer the Xinfang system, and in a very dramatic fashion.  As noted 
above, the number of administrative grievances filed with the Xinfang offices is probably 
somewhere between 4 to 6 million a year, and increased every year from 1993 to 2003.
45
  
In comparison, the number of administrative litigation petitions filed with courts seems 
almost insignificant, at around 100,000 a year.
46
  This number includes all petitions that 
were rejected in the first instance and did not even go to trial.  In addition, the number of 
litigation petitions actually dropped after 1999, when they hit a peak of over 110,000.  By 
2004, the number had gradually declined to 92,000.
47
  The contrast could not be any more 
vivid. 
As with all Chinese statistics, these numbers do not present a completely accurate 
picture, although they are probably not too far off the mark.  As the New York Times has 
reported in recent years, many litigation filings are rejected by court clerks without even 
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being formally recorded or considered.
48
  This raises the likelihood that people may in 
fact attempt to use the litigation system more frequently than the official numbers suggest.  
The problem, however, is that existing data does not allow us to deduce how much more 
frequently.  In the case reported by the Times, the litigating villagers were able to 
formally file a complaint in one court, but were turned down without any record in two 
others.
49
  To complicate matters, we also know that many Xinfang offices also have a 
habit of turning away large numbers of petitions without record.
50
  Combined, this 
limited set of data does not solidly support the inference that the ratio between 
administrative Xinfang petitions and litigation attempts is qualitatively different than 
(roughly) the 5 million to 100,000 figure discussed above.  The actual figure might be, 
perhaps, 30 to 1 instead of 50 to 1, but that does not affect our claim that Xinfang 
petitioning dominates administrative disputes. 
This is not to simplistically claim, of course, that, for every dispute brought to the 
courts, dozens more are filed with Xinfang offices, although that is certainly possible.  
Due to the scarcity of information, we do not know how many Xinfang cases, or, for that 
matter, how many litigation petitions, a single dispute can generate.  As a couple of case 
studies on well-publicized Xinfang petitions demonstrate, however, the number is 
probably not high for either.  The Ningxiang County petitioners described at the outset of 
this essay filed only one Xinfang petition with provincial authorities, and no more than a 
small handful in Beijing.  An even more well-publicized case, the Faxi land and housing 
disputes, seemed to generate only one Xinfang petition, but led to several litigation 
requests.  It seems safe to somewhat ambiguously assume that, of all administrative 
grievances that could be filed with both Xinfang offices and courts, the vast majority go 
to the former.  Exact ratios do not matter as much as the overall trend, which is 
unmistakable. 
These observations are consistent with a number of surveys that have been 
conducted over the past decade.  A 1999-2001 survey in three southern provinces 
indicated that less than 10% of respondents would consider litigation or seek professional 
legal help if they ever had an administrative grievance.
51
  A 2002 study of around 4500 
rural households produce even more extreme figures: only 2% of respondents claimed 
that they would consider approaching a lawyer or initiating a lawsuit to resolve a 
dispute.
52
  The lower figure may have been a result of the study’s focus on rural areas, 
where people are probably more wary of the legal system. 
What makes these trends even more eye-opening is the fact that the government 
has actually been trying to divert such grievances away from Xinfang offices and into the 
courts.  State Council Xinfang regulations, whether in 1996 and 2005, have expressly 
stated that, when a petition is more properly resolved through the people’s congresses, 
administrative reconsideration, or judicial litigation, Xinfang officials should reject the 
petition and transfer the case to the more appropriate government organ (including the 
courts).
53
  While this happens quite rarely in practice, numerous government officials and 
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judges have forcefully advocated the need to enforce this regulation more forcefully and 
channel more petitions into the courts.
54
 
Whether that would indeed be beneficial is an exceedingly complicated question, 
which must take into account not only the success rate of petitions, but also issues of 
government reputation, cultural compatibility, and so on.  These normative concerns are 
not the focus of this paper, which seeks only to explain the phenomenon described above.  
While this paper is apparently the first to describe the numerical contrast between 
Xinfang petitions and formal litigation in clear terms, existing scholarship has noticed 
that the Xinfang offices are considerably more popular.  A number of explanations have 
been circulated, which, as noted in the Introduction, largely fall into two categories.  To 
these we now turn. 
 
Part Two: The Relative Merits of the Xinfang and Litigation Systems 
 Perhaps the most prevalent explanation among scholars and other commentators 
who have analyzed the popularity of the Xinfang system is that it results from simple 
rational choice: formal legal channels, according to quite a few scholars, are simply 
inefficient and usually fail to solve the problem.  This leaves the public with “no better 
recourse” than the Xinfang system.55   The alleged problems are numerous: first, the 
system leaves too many loopholes that allow government authorities to unjustly influence 
the outcome of the litigation;
56
 second, unlike the Xinfang system, judicial litigation does 
not allow multiple appeals;
57
 third, courts have limited jurisdiction and are frequently 
unreceptive;
58
 fourth, the cost of litigation is high;
59
 fifth, local officials frequently 
attempt to discourage litigation through coercive methods, even through physical force;
60
 
sixth, they are only responsive to pressure from administrative superiors and may have 
little respect for court decisions.
61
  Existing criticisms of the administrative litigation 
system, I believe, generally consist of some combination of these six accusations. 
 None of them, however, constitutes a valid reason for rationally choosing Xinfang 
over litigation.  Indeed, they are either logically unrelated, inaccurate, or can also be 
found in the Xinfang system and thus unhelpful.  Let us run through them one-by-one:  
First, since there is no formal procedure and virtually no transparency in the Xinfang 
process, it would be impossible to argue that it is any more immune to unjust influences 
than the courts.  Second, the fact that the Xinfang system allows multiple appeals does 
little to explain why the great majority of petitioners never even engage in administrative 
litigation at all.  After all, it surely does no harm to litigate first, especially since formal 
litigation ensures appellants at least one obligatory review by a higher court.  In fact, a 
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formal court decision, even if unfavorable, gives Xinfang petitioners a firmer 
documentary basis for their claims, which can shorten the process and thus substantially 
lower petitioning costs.  In particular, it allows petitioners to conform to the 
aforementioned requirement that they first pursue judicial means when possible,
62
 and 
thus avoid rejection on that basis.  Third, even though the “concrete action” requirement 
can limit courts’ jurisdiction, the vast majority of administrative grievances that can be 
resolved through both Xinfang offices and formal litigation still go to the former.  
Jurisdictional limitations, therefore, do not explain much.  In fact, Xinfang offices very 
frequently give petitioners a cold shoulder as well.  This is especially common in Beijing, 
where petitioners are often booted back and forth between several reluctant offices before, 
if they are lucky, someone finally accepts their complaint.
63
  Fourth, the cost of using the 
Xinfang system, as several scholars have pointed out, is also substantial.
64
  Given the fact 
that the great majority of cases are conducted without legal assistance for either side,
65
 
litigation costs are probably not significantly higher than the transportation and 
organization costs that Xinfang petitions generally generate.  Fifth, there is no reason 
why officials who will retaliate against litigation will refrain from doing so against 
Xinfang petitions.  According to a survey of petitioners, well over half of the respondents 
had experienced some form of retaliation, either through seizure of personal property or 
through physical assault by local gangs who work for authorities.
66
  Even if these are 
inflated statistics, they indicate a significant problem.  Sixth, although local and 
provincial authorities have shown, on occasion, disrespect for judicial recommendations 
issued through the Xinfang system,
67
 there is no evidence to show that any substantial 
number of formal legal decisions are left unenforced.  Quite the contrary, surveys of 
administrative Xinfang petitioners who have already been in court indicate that barely 2% 
of complaints stem from enforcement failures.
68
  This is consistent with numbers 
provided by Jilin Province, which reported that over 98% of administrative litigation 
decisions issued in 2004 were successfully enforced.
69
  The extremity of these numbers 
suggests that, even if they are not entirely reflective of the national figures, judicial 
decisions are usually enforced.  On the other hand, Xinfang offices frequently have 
problems enforcing their decisions.
70
 
Although the Xinfang and litigation processes share many of the deficiencies 
described above, in practice, they produce distinctly different rates of successful petition.  
Based on official numbers, over 20% of 2004 administrative cases resulted in a victory 
for the plaintiff.
71
  This does not take into account the large number of cases, around 30% 
of all cases, where the plaintiff withdrew his case prior to an official decision.
72
  Thus, 
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plaintiffs won around 30% of cases that reached a final decision, which is generally 
consistent with the overall trend since 1989.
73
  Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume 
that at least some of the withdrawals were motivated by out-of-court settlements that 
satisfied the plaintiff.
74
  Generally speaking, even if we assume that every plaintiff has a 
legitimate complaint and, in theory, should win the case, administrative litigation still 
offers them a somewhat low, but not entirely hopeless, chance of receiving an agreeable 
result.  Of course, if they lose, they still get an official response that explains the decision 
in some detail, which may then serve as the documentary basis for further petitioning. 
 Although administrative litigation does not present very optimistic prospects for 
plaintiffs, it certainly offers much more hope than the Xinfang process.  A commonly 
accepted statistic is that only 0.2% of Xinfang cases lead to successful resolution of the 
dispute.
75
  No matter how you look at this figure or attempt to qualify it, it is shockingly 
low.  Its credibility, however, is not easily challenged, since it was generated by a 
government-sanctioned project that had little incentive to make the Xinfang situation 
seem even worse than it was.
76
  One possible counter-argument may be that there is 
significant “self-selection” going on: the hard cases go the Xinfang offices, while the 
easy ones go to the courts.  This suggestion is rather implausible, since it would imply 
that “hard” cases outnumber “easier” ones by several dozen to one.  Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how this “self-selection” works in real life.  How can people intuitively 
determine which cases are too “difficult” for the courts when the vast majority of them 
never even attempt to litigate?  The more reasonable conclusion is that, when 
administrative litigation is possible, as it frequently is, it is almost always preferable to 
Xinfang.  Scholars who have argued otherwise have usually failed to consider either the 
30% success rate of administrative litigation
77
 or were not aware of the 0.2% figure, 
which, admittedly, was not available until three years ago. 
In fact, it makes sense that litigation would yield a substantially higher chance of 
success.  As argued in the previous section, litigation offers greatly superior procedure 
and clearer standards of judgment.  In addition, judges are under greater mental pressure 
to “get it right,” since judicial decisions usually possess some kind of normative meaning: 
the judge is seen as passing legal, and sometimes moral, judgment on an administrative 
act.  Few would claim that decisions made by Xinfang offices carry the same weight.  We 
may reasonably assume that greater mental pressure leads to increased diligence and care.  
In addition, although China’s judiciary can hardly be considered an “independent” branch 
of government, it is at least somewhat less intertwined in administration than 
administrative organs themselves.  Thus, while there is most certainly a great deal of 
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backdoor dealing and improper influence behind judicial decisions, Xinfang office 
decision-making probably boasts even more. 
Strictly speaking, the administrative litigation system is not difficult to use.  As 
noted, its jurisdiction requirements are fairly easy to satisfy as long as the government 
has actually taken concrete action against the plaintiff.  Evidence gathering, unless the 
plaintiff demands that his own lawyer engage in discovery, is customarily conducted by 
the court.
78
  The standard of proof for plaintiffs is the same as in civil cases.
79
  The entire 
trial process is, as with most civil law legal systems, much more streamlined and simple 
than what American lawyers are accustomed to.  This also lowers the need for lawyers to 
manage every step of the petition, although legal aid lawyers are often available at no 
charge.
80
  All in all, administrative litigation is a reasonably accessible system that, as the 
statistics demonstrate so convincingly, is vastly superior to Xinfang petitioning in terms 
of success rate.  And yet, the great majority of Chinese are apparently blind to this. 
 A few scholars have put forth a theory that can potentially explain why people 
still use the Xinfang system despite its extraordinarily low success rate.  Xinfang 
petitioners, they argue, have more than just the resolution of their administrative 
grievance in mind when they file their complaints.
81
  They go to Xinfang offices because 
it allows them to speak directly to administrative staff and satisfy their psychological 
desire for political participation.  In other words, the Xinfang system is popular because 
people not only care about resolve disputes over “the actions of individual officials in 
carrying out policy decisions, such as the construction of major hydroelectric projects,” 
but also “demand for participation in the process of drafting these policies in the first 
place.”82  Thus, even if the Xinfang system actually offers a substantially lower chance of 
actually resolving their disputes, people still use it because it allows them to at least 
formally participate in the making of political decisions.  Intuitively, judicial litigation 
does not seem to possess this function. 
 While this explanation seems to make some theoretical sense, it cannot make 
sense of the general facts.  It is important to remember that the great majority of Xinfang 
petitioners are not there to complain about general regulations or policies, but to seek 
redress for specific acts of administrative abuse or neglect.
83
  First and foremost, they are 
there to protect their personal interests.  Given that administrative litigation offers an 
exponentially higher chance of success in that regard, it is extremely unlikely that the 
desire for political participation would be sufficient to lure so many people away from 
judicial litigation.  Moreover, the “political participation” theory, if we may call it that, 
cannot explain why more people do not pursue both Xinfang petitioning and litigation.  
After all, that would seem to offer the best of both worlds.  Although the costs of Xinfang 
petitioning and litigation may prohibit many people from pursuing both simultaneously, 
there is, most probably, a significant number that do possess enough resources.  
Moreover, the cost of pursuing both is not simply the sum of engaging in both separately.  
As noted above, litigating first gives people a firmer documentary basis for further 
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petitioning, which can shorten the process and thus cut costs.  This indicates that, even if 
the desire for political participation is widely prevalent, as long as we assume rational 
choice, we would still expect to see a fairly large number of them also pursue litigation.  
This, of course, is not true in reality.   
 What about the potential suggestion that people simply have the wrong 
impression?  Can’t they just believe that Xinfang petitioning is actually the more 
effective method?  Even if this were true, we would still have to explain how that 
severely wrong impression came to exist in the first place, since irrational or factually 
wrong assumptions do not spring magically from thin air.  In our present case, it seems 
unlikely that the dominant cause was simple misinformation.  A recent study shows that 
people in both Beijing and poorer rural areas who have no litigation experience tend to 
have a generally favorable impression of courts. 
84
 Even so, the great majority of them 
(well over 90%), still refrain from litigating their personal grievances.
85
 This suggests 
that misinformation about the effectiveness of courts is not a major cause of that 
reluctance. 
In the end, the decision to eschew litigation is clearly counterproductive, while 
widespread misinformation seems unlikely.  It is much more reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that the widespread dislike of litigation stems not from a rational evaluation of 
cost and benefit, whether based on correct or incorrect information, but from some 
“irrational” fear (I use quotation marks here to indicate that such fears may well be just as 
useful and prudent as more “rational” thought processes) that ignores and transcends 
cost-and-benefit analyses.  “Irrational” fears are, of course, capable of distorting cost-
and-benefit analysis.  As several scholars, particularly Dan Kahan, have argued in recent 
years, when faced with a problem, people are much more likely to believe in solutions 
that appeal to their cultural worldview or subconscious personal preferences, which, in 
turn, are frequently shaped by historical traditions or social norms.
86
  Thus, “cost-and-
benefit analysis” is not a strictly rationale comparison of various measurable factors, but 
is instead heavily influenced by our inherent “prejudices” or “habits.”  Not only can such 
habits compel a person to take a certain course of action even when he realizes, to some 
extent, that it is unreasonable, but they can also sway our reasoning in a more 
fundamental sense: they can make a habitually or culturally comfortable solution seem 
inherently more reasonable than its alternatives.
87
  As a crude example, many children 
find themselves arguing vehemently (and usually earnestly) that spinach is nutritionally 
useless, even though their understanding of the food goes no further than their instinctual 
dislike of its taste.  But it does not matter which kind of thought process is more prevalent 
among Xinfang petitioners: the key point is that most of them, indeed the great majority 
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of them, most probably possess some sort of “irrational” fear.  The challenge, of course, 
then becomes finding a reasonable source for this fear. 
One possible cause of such “irrationality” is that people prefer to bring their 
petitions to the highest authorities possible, because they have a blind faith that higher-
level government organs will be more sympathetic and less corrupted than local or 
provincial bosses.  In some sense, distance generates a perception of beauty.  Existing 
surveys do show that the public has a significantly higher opinion of the State Council 
and central Party and government organs than of provincial and local authorities.  Thus, 
assuming that the Xinfang system offers easier access to these high authorities than 
litigation, people might very well prefer the former, even if, in reality, that would lower 
their chance of successful petition.   At least one scholar has hinted that this kind of 
explanation might be helpful.
88
  The problem is, however, that the “easier access” 
assumption is actually false.  In reality, central authorities see only a very small portion 
of Xinfang petitions.  For example, the Supreme People’s Court handled 147,665 
petitions in 2004, whereas the entire judiciary, as argued above, handled at least 4 
million.
89
  Indeed, the Xinfang regulations expressly forbid bypassing local Xinfang 
offices in favor of direct appeals to higher authorities.  Thus, access to these higher 
authorities is no easier under the Xinfang system than under the litigation system, 
especially since administrative litigants may often bring their original complaints directly 
to courts that are one level higher than the defendants.
90
  If, for example, the target of the 
grievance was a county level official, the initial venue of both litigation and Xinfang 
petitioning would be at the city level.  While one may appeal to higher level Xinfang 
offices if the city office is unhelpful, it is not like Chinese law does not allow legal 
appeals.  The petitioner might even choose to litigate first, and then legally pursue 
Xinfang at a higher level.  We have, of course, shown that this rarely happens. 
A more popular theory, as noted in the Introduction, has been what I have called 
the “anti-legal tradition” explanation.  Chinese people, some scholars argue, have a 
history of utilizing non-legal means to resolve disputes, both civil and administrative, and 
continue to do so out of cultural habit.  In other words, they are simply not accustomed to 
using law in certain circumstances.  These explanations have a broader sweep than 
necessary, since they suggest that Chinese people have historically avoided litigation for 
virtually any type of dispute, not just administrative grievances.  The next Part seeks to 
demonstrate that, quite the contrary, China has a long historical tradition of utilizing law 
and litigation to resolve disputes, and that administrative disputes are no exception. 
 
Part Three: Historical Precedents? 
 I. Qing Litigation Systems 
 It might be best to clarify at the very outset that I have absolutely no intention of 
arguing against the use of historical comparison in studying the Xinfang phenomenon.  
Quite the opposite, any culture-based explanation must rely at least partially on historical 
analysis, or else it carries no weight.  The problem with existing scholarship is not that it 
seeks to find historical “precedents” for the popularity of Xinfang petitioning, but that its 
use of historical evidence is not sufficiently careful.  This leads to a number of mistaken 
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beliefs about China’s legal traditions.  Comparisons based upon these beliefs are, of 
course, misleading. 
Several Chinese scholars, along with at least one western academic, have 
incorrectly highlighted the Xinfang system’s non-legal nature as the cause of its 
popularity.  To prove that the Xinfang system is “well-rooted” in Chinese historical 
tradition, they then seek to demonstrate that Chinese people have historically preferred 
the “rule of man” (“ren zhi”) to the “rule of law” (“fa zhi”),91 and that traditional Chinese 
governments sought to resolve criminal, civil and administrative problems through 
“administrative,” not “legal,” means.92  Despite the sweeping nature of these claims, their 
proponents have yet to provide a detailed analysis of Chinese legal history to back them 
up, and what evidence they do offer usually comes in the form of broad generalizations.  
Such generalizations generally fall into three categories, all of which, as I will now 
explain, have fairly crippling factual or logical problems. 
As noted above, proponents of the “anti-legal tradition” explanation tend not to 
distinguish between administrative grievances and other causes for litigation, including 
civil disputes.  To meet their claims head-on, my counter-arguments will first discuss the 
Qing legal system in more general terms, and then turn specifically to administrative 
litigation after I have dealt with the third category. 
The first category includes observations that the Qing government did not have a 
fully independent judiciary.
93
  This observation stems, of course, from the fact that local 
government magistrates performed both administrative functions, such as tax-collecting 
and labor regulation, and legal functions, which included hearing all criminal, civil, and 
administrative disputes within his geographical realm of governance.  At least one 
scholar has used this to argue that the way these traditional governments resolved 
disputes was more “administrative” than “legal.”  That is, its goal was more to solidify 
social order and ensure good governance than to pass legal judgment.   
There are a number of problems with this argument.  First of all, it takes an overly 
simplistic view of local-level adjudication.  As historians have realized for some time, the 
great majority of local-level cases that were not criminal were not handled by the 
magistrate himself.
94
  Instead, he left them to clerks and assistants who specialized in 
legal work.  This was largely due to necessity: most local-level magistrates had very 
limited knowledge of the law, while the clerks and assistants were usually highly 
experienced specialists.  Perhaps due to some commendable acknowledgement of his 
own limitations, the magistrate almost never intervened in their work unless it triggered a 
public outcry.
95
  In addition, bureaus and officials that specialized in judicial affairs, both 
formally and in practice, did exist at higher levels of government, such as in the 
provinces or in Beijing, where the Ministry of Punishments (Xing Bu) was located.
96
  
Thus, one could argue that, in effect, the Qing did have a specialized “judiciary” at all 
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levels of government.  This “judiciary” was not, of course, fully “independent” in the 
modern American sense, but neither is the modern Chinese judiciary.
97
   
More importantly, the fact that a single official performs both administrative and 
legal duties does not mean that those duties are indistinguishable from or interfere with 
each other.  In fact, the opposite was true.  The Qing government treated laws quite 
differently from administrative decisions.  Unlike the latter, laws were supposedly 
immutable, “not to be changed in ten thousand generations.”98  The Qing Code could 
only be formally changed through legally defined procedures, which occurred only once, 
in 1725.
99
  In addition, as historians have long realized, legal decision-making in Qing 
courts was rigorously regulated by formal procedural rules, standards of evidence, and 
fairly systematic definitions of actionable misconduct.  Indeed, one of the main tasks of 
Qing appeals courts was determining whether lower courts had applied “fair judicial 
procedure” in their investigation and decision-making.100  As in the West, Qing courts 
were directed to “ascertain the facts of a case after a careful investigation of physical 
evidence, interrogation of the litigants and witnesses, and so on.”101  We now know that 
there were legal limitations on how much torture could be used to obtain testimony, 
formal categorization of evidence, including oral testimony, physical evidence, official 
autopsies and expert examination, documentary evidence, and others.
102
  Trials and 
presentation of evidence were generally open to the public, and thus had a certain 
theatrical element.
103
  All of these procedural rules significantly limited the amount of 
administrative discretion officials could wield, and thus served to formally separate their 
administrative duties from their legal ones.  Moreover, they were nominally required, 
with no exceptions, to give citations to the Qing Code for every judicial decision they 
made.
104
  The message was quite obvious: legal decisions were, at least formally, 
supposed to be based on law, not administrative necessity.  Qing law clearly drew a 
distinct line between the government’s judicial functions and its administrative functions, 
and local level officials were expected to understand this distinction even as they 
performed both.  This was not lost upon the general population, as the emergence and 
high popularity of “litigation masters” in the mid and late-Qing demonstrates quite 
vividly: people knew that legal proceedings were a separate realm of affairs that needed 
special expertise.
105
 
Studies published over the past decade or so have demonstrated that these legal 
regulations were not merely formalities that could be readily ignored in practice.  Instead, 
officials did adhere to formal procedure when presiding over cases.  A well-known 1996 
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study published by Philip Huang demonstrates that, based on a sample drawn from three 
counties, decisions in civil disputes were generally consistent with legal rules and did not 
seem to be unduly influenced by administrative concerns.
106
  Legal decisions also 
employed the rhetoric of logical causation, attempting to present their conclusions as 
logical consequences of legal principles.
107
  This suggests that Qing magistrates 
considered themselves bound by the law, and that they recognized the difference between 
their administrative and legal duties.  In fact, quite a few Qing scholars argued that 
hearing litigation disputes, being the key to social harmony, was the most important duty 
of a local magistrate.
108
 
The second kind of evidence that proponents of the “anti-legal tradition” 
explanation have presented focuses on the large amount of anti-litigation rhetoric 
historically issued by both the government and by a large number of Confucian scholars, 
who very often were, of course, officials themselves.
109
  Such rhetoric seems to suggest a 
historical tradition of avoiding legal solutions to disputes, which might explain why 
modern Chinese prefer Xinfang petitioning to litigation.  As Confucius himself put it, the 
ideal government was not one that effectively resolved all litigated disputes, but one that 
managed to “have no litigation.”110  This ideal eventually became so popular among 
educated scholars that the emperor himself occasionally would express a desire to curb 
litigation.
111
  The Qing emperor Jiaqing, for example, once issued an edict instructing his 
officials on “extinguishing litigation and bringing peace to the common people.”112  The 
most obvious problem with using these statements to explain the Xinfang phenomenon is 
that they do not advocate resolving disputes through a non-legal, but nonetheless 
government-oriented, system like Xinfang petitioning.  Instead, they advocate resolving 
the dispute before it goes into any kind of government appeals process.  Confucian 
scholars and bureaucrats who followed the “anti-litigation” ideal strived to provide 
enough moral education to the general public so that no disputes would have to be 
formally resolved through government arbitration.
113
  The modern Xinfang system would 
most likely be no better than formal litigation in the eyes of these men.  Thus, their 
statements provide no historical “precedent” for that system’s popularity. 
In addition, despite the wide popularity of anti-litigation rhetoric, “common 
people” still brought a considerable number of suits into court each year.  While existing 
academic estimates on the volume of Qing litigation varies wildly, most historians agree 
that the total number of cases was not insignificant.
114
  According to the records of one 
Qing magistrate, on a particularly busy day, he would “receive one or two thousand 
litigation petitions.  Even on less busy days, the number would often surpass 1200 or 
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1300.”115  Since the local government accepted litigation documents for 72 days each 
year,
116
 the total number of litigation petitions received yearly by that magistrate would 
reach 100,000.  Other documents indicate a much lower number: an average county 
might receive anywhere from 200 to 500 civil cases a year, while the volume of 
administrative litigation was about 40% of that.
117
  Considering the extremely wide gap 
between these estimates, the reality probably lies somewhere in the middle.  In any case, 
even proponents of the lower figures agree that Qing people displayed, to some extent, an 
increasing eagerness to litigate.
118
  If an average county took in 490 new cases, civil and 
administrative, during a given year, it would mean that one family in roughly every fifty 
had brought a new suit into court.
119
   
All in all, these numbers are lower than what the United States is accustomed to, 
suggesting that common people did indeed dislike litigation, but not severely enough to 
prevent them from litigating when necessary.  Confucian anti-litigation rhetoric was, 
therefore, somewhat effective, but certainly not as influential as its advocates would have 
liked.  Moreover, as noted above, the nature of rhetoric suggests that its effect would not 
merely have been to discourage litigation, but to discourage people from seeking official 
intervention of any kind.  In fact, the reason Confucian scholars singled out litigation for 
attack was probably that it was the most common means by which people approached the 
government.  As Philip Huang has famously argued, when common people finally made 
up their minds to seek government intervention, they generally did so through filing a 
formal legal complaint, which initiated the entire process of judicial decision-making that 
we have discussed in some detail, and not through seeking non-legal administrative 
intervention.
120
 
The third type of argument some have made in favor of the “anti-legal tradition” 
thesis is comparison to the Qing’s legal appeals system, which allowed litigants to pursue 
a virtually unlimited number of appeals, potentially culminating in a “capital appeal” 
(“jing kong”) directly to the emperor himself.  Some have argued that this system 
contained “the seeds” of Xinfang petitioning, highlighting the fact that the latter also 
allows an unlimited number of appeals.
121
  Such arguments, however, fail to address the 
fact that, apart from allowing multiple appeals, the Qing appeals system shares very few 
similarities with Xinfang petitioning.  First and foremost, Qing appeals courts, like local 
courts and, indeed, the overall litigation system in general, were distinctly legal in nature.  
As noted above, each level of appeals court reviewed lower-level decisions by the same 
process and criteria: no improper procedure, no recantations of testimony, no illegal 
torture, and so on.  Capital appeals were obviously different, as the emperor himself was 
not formally bound by rules of procedure of defined legal standards, but he generally did 
not, in fact, pass judgment.  Instead, his role was to determine whether the appeal had 
sufficient merit and then, if it did, either dispatch an imperial agent to conduct hearings or 
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direct the provincial governor to re-hear the case.
122
  Since these officials were bound by 
formal “trial rules” that applied “long-established principles” from provincial appeals, 
capital appeals were most certainly not a procedure and regulation vacuum like the 
modern Xinfang system is.
123
  Moreover, at any level in the appeals process, the appeals 
court’s decision still took the form of an official judgment, not an administrative decision 
on whether to extend government aid to the litigant’s grievance.   
Some have also argued that the Qing appeals system served certain administrative 
functions, and was therefore partially administrative in nature.  Certainly, appeals to 
higher levels of authority did help the central government gather information about the 
performance of local-level adjudicators, and Qing officials were indeed subject to 
“performance reviews” on their handling of judicial litigation.124  However, the existence 
of two administrative side-effects does not make the entire appeals system non-legal.  In 
fact, the modern Chinese judicial system serves similar information-gathering functions, 
and modern judges, like their Qing counterparts, are rewarded or reprimanded based on 
their trial record.  Yet no one would venture to argue that the modern Chinese judiciary is 
a hybrid administrative-legal organ.  Ultimately, the best modern analogy to the Qing 
appeals system is simply the current appeals system, not an administrative organ like the 
Xinfang offices.
125
 
In addition, although the level of capital appeals increased throughout the 19
th
 
Century, they peaked at about two thousand per year.
126
  In comparison, the entire 
judicial system took around 700,000 cases annually.
127
  Thus, even if the number of 
capital appeals was still large enough to severely burden the central government,
128
 it was 
actually only a tiny fraction of the total judicial workload.
129
  Although the total number 
of provincial-level appeals has yet to be systematically estimated, it seems safe to 
tentatively assume that it was relatively low as well, especially since a substantial number 
of appellants circumvented the provincial court and went directly to Beijing.
130
  This 
suggests that the great majority of cases were resolved at the local level and, therefore, 
that the Qing tolerance of multiple appeals was significantly less important to the overall 
functioning of its legal system than some have assumed.  Thus, even if this tolerance can 
be considered a cultural tradition that finds its current reincarnation in the Xinfang 
system, it is altogether not significant enough to explain that system’s enormous 
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popularity.  Similarly, the Qing capital appeals system was simply not used frequently 
enough to warrant consideration as one of China’s key legal traditions. 
Although the discussion above has been organized as a three-part refutation of 
existing “anti-legal tradition” explanations of the Xinfang phenomenon, it also gives a 
fairly clear overview of the Qing litigation system: even though it often shared personnel 
with the government’s administrative organs, it was unmistakably legal in nature, a fact 
that both officials and common people generally acknowledged.  While this observation 
is certainly useful enough, this paper’s focus on administrative grievances makes it 
logically necessary to go one step further by focusing on Qing administrative litigation.  
After all, it is at least conceivable that administrative disputes were a special area, in 
which the social and political ramifications of suing an official made litigation seem 
especially undesirable.  Thus, even if people were willing to let the government operate 
through litigation in other kinds of disputes, they may well have demanded that the 
government provide alternative, less formal means of resolving administrative grievances.   
While no one has made this specific argument yet, I will still attempt to preempt it. 
The Qing criminal code allowed commoners to bring allegations of official 
misconduct to both local magistrates and higher authorities in the provincial or central 
government.
131
  Since the Qing had no separate civil code or administrative law, instead 
laying out all causes for prosecution or litigation in its criminal law, these administrative 
actions had virtually the same legal status as civil litigation.  Both were initiated through 
the filing of written statements with a judicial court, and went through comparable phases 
of investigation and adjudication.  The procedural rules and requirements of legal citation 
described above were generally applicable to all suits under the criminal code, and thus 
applied to administrative litigation with no exception.  The central government actually 
took extra care to maintain the objectivity and fairness of administrative litigation.  If an 
official was obligated to adjudicate a case involving misconduct by those directly under 
his supervision (whose actions he was also responsible for), he would receive no more 
than some very light disciplining as long as he ensured a fair trial.
132
  Such guarantees 
helped maintain the separation between the government’s legal and judicial functions.   
As with China’s current administrative litigation system, a fairly wide array of 
government misdeeds could be sued, including disputes over state financial practices and, 
of course, alleged acts of personal corruption.
133
  All usual routes of judicial appeal, 
including the capital appeals, were open to administrative suits.  In fact, the capital appeal 
was theoretically off-limits to civil disputes,
134
 giving administrative litigation an 
additional level of review.  While, as argued above, such review was rarely utilized in 
practice,
135
 it was nonetheless an attempt to increase the accountability of administrative 
adjudication.  Generally speaking, administrative litigation had essentially the same legal 
status and procedures as civil litigation, with a few more safeguards against unjustified 
administrative influence.  It bears virtually no resemblance to the current Xinfang system. 
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The main difference between civil and administrative litgation was that, in 
practice, the central government actually encouraged the latter, whereas it disliked the 
former.  As a Nankai University professor has argued, Ming and Qing governments saw 
administrative litigation as a fairly effective way to control lower level official activity, 
and made no effort to discourage its use of commoners.
136
  Thus, their use of Confucian 
“anti-litigation” rhetoric was often limited to civil disputes.  This led to a fairly large 
number of administrative suits.  While we have no nationwide figures, a case study of 
several counties indicates that administrative litigation consistently constituted around 10 
to 15 percent of new cases throughout the later Qing and early Republican eras, and about 
30% of non-criminal (civil and administrative) litigation.
137
  This would have brought the 
total number of administrative cases to around 200,000.  During peak years, 
administrative grievances could even outnumber civil litigation.
138
  These numbers are, of 
course, strikingly different from what the current judiciary faces: over the past decade, 
courts received around 4 million civil cases a year, but only 100,000 administrative suits.  
There is no apparent continuity with Qing practice. 
The Qing government actually did possess an administrative agent similar to 
modern Xinfang offices.  This was the imperial censor, who monitored the performance 
of government agents at all levels, and also provided the emperor with commentary on 
particular government actions, including individual legal decisions.
139
  The censor could 
move for imperial intervention in local government activities and, due to his high status, 
was frequently asked to personally participate in everyday decisions at various levels of 
the bureaucracy.
140
  By the Qing, imperial censors were present in most major provinces, 
and led a large staff that permeated every level of government, effectively forming a 
nationwide “network” of inspectors.141  Common people were allowed to approach these 
inspectors, present administrative grievances, and seek redress.
142
  The decision-making 
of these censor offices was not formally regulated by procedural law; while their 
decisions, like those of Xinfang offices, did not constitute formal legal judgment.  In all 
these ways, imperial censors resembled modern Xinfang offices much more closely than 
any Qing judicial system.  This resemblance, however, does not extend to rate of use.  
Historians have yet to publish any evidence indicating that these censors were 
approached by petitioners with much frequency.  While scholars have noted that the 
capital appeals system was frequently overburdened, no one has made a comparable 
claim about the censors.  Quite the contrary, the censor system seemed to have fallen into 
disuse by the end of the dynasty, largely due to government negligence.
143
  It is hard to 
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imagine how this could have happened if it had been receiving a large number of 
petitions.  The existence of a Qing institution that closely resembled the Xinfang system 
but was largely ignored by the general public drives home our point that the Xinfang 
phenomenon can find no precedent in Qing legal history. 
 
II. Communist Origins? 
What about more recent history?  In particular, could the Communist Party’s 
reliance on the Xinfang system during earlier phases of the PRC have created some kind 
of path-dependency on that institution?
144
  After all, for over four decades after the PRC’s 
creation, the Xinfang system was the only way to resolve administrative disputes apart 
from internal review.  It only seems natural that people would have continued to use that 
institution out of pure habit, even after a new and, frankly, far better way to resolve 
administrative grievances had been established in the form of the ALL.  While this 
explanation makes quite a bit of intuitive sense, it has its own share of problems. 
First and foremost, the history of the Xinfang system suggests that it has not had 
enough to time to develop into an important “habit” of the general public.  This claim 
probably seems very odd, since four decades is certainly not a short period of time.  The 
problem is that the system’s development was not linearly upward during that period.  
Instead, the Cultural Revolution forced the system, which was considered a “bourgeois 
practice,” into general disuse for over a decade.145  As scholars have noted, during the 
Cultural Revolution, most Xinfang offices were simply shut down.  Others existed in 
name, but did not engage in anything that could be called “working with the masses.”146  
This decade-long vacuum has led several scholars to place the beginning of the current 
Xinfang tradition in the 1980s, and not in the 1950s when the system was formally 
established.
147
  Even after the offices were eventually reestablished during the 1980s, 
their work consisted mainly of abnormal political grievances accumulated during the 
Cultural Revolution.  Normal administrative disputes and litigation-related petitions did 
not become the bulk of their work until the late 1980s.  Thus, in 1989, when the ALL was 
passed, Xinfang offices had been in normal operation for no more than four or five years.  
Preceding those years was a prolonged period of political chaos in which people had 
access to neither legal nor administrative redress to their administrative grievances.  Thus, 
even if habitual reliance on the Xinfang system did exist when administrative litigation 
became available, it had yet to become deeply entrenched in the Chinese public’s socio-
political life.  This weak reliance does not seem capable of explaining the enormous 
preference for Xinfang petitioning over litigation that the public currently displays. 
Second, the comparison with the civil litigation system suggests that something 
more than simple anti-legal path dependency is at work here.  Prior to a series of legal 
reforms carried out in 1979, civil disputes in China were primarily resolved through 
government-authorized mediation committees, set up under a 1954 law concerning the 
establishment of “People’s mediation committees.”148  Mediators were elected by public 
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representatives or by local people’s congresses, and could be replaced if negligent 
towards their duties.  Few formal rules governed their investigatory and decision-making 
powers, but they were not allowed to issue punishment or force a party to participate in 
mediation.
149
  Like the Xinfang system, this non-legal means of dispute resolution 
remains in widespread use even today: in 1998, these committees handled around 
5,267,000 cases, although this number had declined to around 4,414,233 by 2004.
150
  But 
the similarities end here.  Once legal reforms in 1979 made civil litigation a realistic 
option, the number of civil disputes skyrocketed, growing from around 300,000 cases in 
1978 to 3,375,069 in 1998, and then to well over 4 million by 2004.
151
  While litigation is 
still used somewhat less frequently than official mediation, the contrast is nowhere near 
as large as the difference between administrative litigation and Xinfang petitioning.  Of 
course, the reasons behind civil litigation’s booming popularity are probably extremely 
complicated, but there is no need to examine them here.  My point is merely that, since 
earlier Communist reliance on non-legal means in civil dispute-resolution did not 
generate a strong enough “path-dependency” to prevent the widespread use of civil 
litigation, there is no apparent reason why earlier Communist reliance on Xinfang 
petitioning could have blocked the prevalence of administrative litigation. 
Finally, if path-dependency is really the main cause of the Xinfang phenomenon, 
then we would expect the use of administrative litigation to display one of two numerical 
trends: either the habitual reliance of Xinfang petitioning is so strong that it keeps 
litigation at a consistently low level, that is, without much growth at all; or there is some 
slow, but steady growth as people eventually overcome their path-dependency to take 
advantage of the superior effectiveness of litigation.  The actual numbers follow neither 
of these scenarios.  Instead, administrative litigation swiftly rose in popularity during the 
first few years of its existence, peaked in 1999, but has experienced decreasing or 
stagnating popularity ever since.
152
  In comparison, the number of Xinfang petitions 
actually decreased during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
153
 but then began a prolonged 
period of sustained growth after 1993.
154
  These trends do not fit in well with a “habitual 
reliance” explanation and, instead, suggest that people were eager to try out the new 
litigation system after its establishment, but then abandoned it after experiencing some 
sort of discomfort (but not relative lack of effectiveness, as argued above). 
 
Part Four: Towards a New Explanation 
 The previous discussion narrows down the field of potential explanations quite 
severely: we have ruled out path-dependency on Communist-era institutions, any attempt 
to identify a powerful anti-litigation tradition in Chinese history, and all claims that 
litigation is less effective than Xinfang petitioning.  This leads to the following 
conclusions: something about the administrative litigation system makes the Chinese 
public uncomfortable, driving it away even though litigation is objectively more effective 
than the Xinfang system.  This cannot, however, simply be the fact that litigation is a 
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judicial process.  Instead, it is necessarily found in the ALL’s content, in the way 
administrative litigation is set up.  As the Qing’s legal history and the current popularity 
of civil litigation demonstrate, Chinese people are perfectly capable of accepting certain 
kinds of litigation systems, even administrative litigation systems.  But what aspect of the 
ALL makes it so unpopular?  The best way to approach this is probably by comparing the 
ALL with litigation systems that have gained, or used to gain, popular acceptance. 
 There are actually few procedural differences between the ALL and the civil 
litigation system.
155
  Definitions of jurisdiction and venue are obviously not comparable 
between the two, so we will limit our discussion to the investigation and trial stages.  In 
both administrative and civil litigation, discovery powers are held by the court, although 
the plaintiff may conduct his own investigation.  In administrative cases, however, the 
defendant (the government) cannot request evidence from either the plaintiff or from 
external witnesses.  This is largely a formality, as only the court can compel discovery.  
While the ALL does not expressly lay out how trials should be conducted, administrative 
litigation apparently follows the same trial procedure that was laid out in the civil 
procedure law: examination of evidence, three short rounds of oral argument, 
consideration by the judges, and issuance of the decision.  Standards of proof are 
expressly made identical between civil and administrative litigation.  Appeals procedures, 
too, are basically alike. 
 The ALL, however, does have two important peculiarities: first, courts are not 
allowed to attempt mediation; second, they must hold a public trial unless “national 
security or personal privacy” concerns dictate otherwise. 156   In comparison, civil 
litigation has fairly detailed guidelines on how mediation should be conducted, while 
plaintiffs of civil suits can be allowed to request a private trial even when the “national 
security and personal privacy” exceptions do not apply.157  While administrative plaintiffs 
are allowed to withdraw their suits before a decision is issued, the court is not allowed, at 
least in theory, to actively generate such a result.  These regulations suggest that the goal 
of administrative litigation is primarily to determine right and wrong, while civil 
litigation places much more emphasis on dispute resolution and preservation of “social 
harmony,” to borrow the most recent catch-phrase in Chinese politics.  At least on paper, 
administrative adjudication would seem to offer less chance of reconciliation between the 
two parties, thus making the entire process considerably more adversarial than civil 
litigation.  Of course, the ALL might still seem predominantly judge-centered and thus 
not very adversarial by American standards, but that is obviously not the correct legal 
system to compare with. 
 Comparison of the ALL with historical Chinese administrative litigation systems 
yields a similar conclusion.  As noted above and in existing scholarship, traditional 
Chinese scholars and governments, driven by a powerful desire to buttress “social 
harmony,” generally aimed to lessen the volume of litigation.  When suits were 
nevertheless brought into court, magistrates were forced to follow rules of procedure, but 
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often continued to push for settlement.
158
  The law itself did not prohibit such attempts, 
while rhetoric from both government and academic sources clearly encouraged them.  
Even when a formal judgment was issued, the decision would frequently call for 
conciliation between the two sides, its language suggesting that preservation of social 
peace and concord was one of the most important goals of adjudication.
159
  Officials were 
also given a significant amount of leeway when determining suitable fines, repayments, 
and punishments, and would often exercise discretion based on concerns of morality and 
custom (“ren qing”).160  All in all, the Qing litigation system gave off the impression that 
it treated the litigants less like adversaries who respectively represented right and wrong, 
and more like petitioners who simply wanted to solve a problem.  Thus, the system 
placed significant emphasis on resolving their disputes and, ideally, ensuring that similar 
conflicts would not arise in the future.  This stands, of course, in clear contrast with the 
ALL, which does not allow mediation and puts disputes on open display by conducting 
public trials.   
Since mediation in Qing administrative litigation has apparently never been 
studied, most of these conclusions were generated by studying civil disputes.  But there is 
no evidence that most administrative disputes were treated much differently.  After all, 
civil and litigation both stemmed from a unified criminal code and used similar legal 
procedure.  There are indeed records of dissatisfied administrative litigants who, after 
realizing that provincial magistrates were more intent on generating some kind of 
compromise and thus resolving the dispute, made the long trek to Beijing to obtain a 
more clear-cut decision.
161
   
Accusations of serious corruption or abuse were, of course, treated much 
differently, especially since the government treated administrative litigation as an 
important means of controlling lower-level officials.  Existing scholarship does not seem 
to give any clues on the volume of such accusations, but the fairly high volume of 
administrative litigation suggests that serious cases warranting extensive investigation 
and severe punishment constituted only a minority of the total caseload.  After all, it is 
hard to believe that more than a fraction of the 200,000 or so administrative disputes 
brought annually before Qing courts could have been issues of serious corruption, 
especially when there were only around 1300 counties in the entire country.  As 
historians have noted, a local magistrate was held responsible for the behavior of his 
subordinates, and serious accusations against them would frequently lead to an official 
impeachment (successful or not) against him as well.
162
  Since we have no evidence that 
the average Qing local magistrate was impeached on a regular basis, it is probably safe to 
assume that such serious administrative suits were rare.
163
  Even if we suppose that each 
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county generated ten serious scandals or disputes a year, which would suggest that the 
political position of local magistrates was in constant jeopardy, these cases would still 
constitute less than 5% of all administrative cases.  In most cases, the litigants obviously 
cared enough about their own interests to go to court, but the offense was probably not so 
grave as to warrant a heightened level of concern or scrutiny.  Most, in fact, seemed to be 
rather petty offenses involving minor acts of corruption such as attempts to evade due 
bills.
164
  There is, therefore, little reason to assume that the great majority of 
administrative disputes were treated very differently from civil suits.   
The use of mediation in a system of adjudication does not make it non-legal.  As 
Philip Huang demonstrates, most cases brought before Qing courts did result in a clear, 
law-based, decision for one of the parties.
165
  The issue I am attempting to highlight here 
is not whether magistrates or judges refused to apply the law, but how they applied it.  
Leaving open the possibility of mediation makes the litigation process seem less like a 
contest.  When encouraging mediation or conciliation, even after the issuance of a formal 
decision, the judge becomes more than just a cold arbitrator who issues judgments of 
right and wrong, but a kind of father figure (or, in Chinese, “Fu Mu Guan,” which 
literally means “an official who is like a parent”) who hopes to teach moral lessons and 
preserve social peace.
166
  The comparison to a parent who is settling a dispute between 
two troublesome brothers is perhaps a bit too extreme, but it captures the essence of 
traditional Chinese adjudication in many ways.  In some recorded cases, the judge would 
make a considerable effort to ensure that the litigants had learned their moral lesson, 
sometimes even by threatening a decision that neither side desired.
167
  The law gave 
magistrates considerable leeway to engage in this kind of “education,” but the 
proceedings still followed formal procedure, and the end result was still an official 
decision that cited the Qing Code.  Legal philosophers, of course, still debate whether law 
can take morality into account without losing its status as law,
168
 but there is no 
indication that these moral lessons and calls for conciliation were part of the law.  Instead, 
they might simply be considered “add-ons” that the law permitted.  On the other hand, 
they did have a profound effect on the external appearance of legal proceedings, making 
them seem less confrontational and, theoretically, less destructive of social relations. 
There is good reason to believe that the less-adversarial nature of Qing litigation 
was welcomed by the public.  While we have demonstrated that commoners most likely 
preferred judicial methods when seeking government involvement in their disputes, it is 
equally important to remember that they were not particularly eager to approach the 
government in the first place.  The anti-litigation and pro-social harmony views 
advocated so enthusiastically by Confucian scholars for centuries could not have failed to 
have any effect on social behavior, although it certainly did not prevent a large number of 
cases from going to trial.  All in all, litigation rates in China have historically been much 
lower than in the United States, and there is no indication that things are about to 
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change.
169
  The great majority of disputes were resolved within the local communities, 
either by negotiation between family elders, or through mediation conducted by a 
mutually respected neighbor.
170
  The law often lurked somewhere in the background of 
these mediations, either as a standard of “good” behavior or as a bargaining chip, but the 
government itself had no role in the proceedings.  Confucian ethics and communal ties 
led these communal mediations to forcefully encourage mutual reconciliation, although a 
basic determination of right and wrong was also made when the responsibilities were 
clear beyond dispute.  In addition, since the mediations were often conducted by people 
of elder age, they frequently included a large dose of moral lecturing and persuasion.  
People preferred to maintain good social ties within the community, to “save face,” so to 
speak, for as many parties as possible.  As most civil disputes arose between neighbors 
and people who shared a significant amount of social space, it would not do to simply 
mete out “justice,” but neglect to repair the social relations that had been damaged during 
the conflict.
171
   
Given communal mediation’s high rate of usage and success, even those directly 
involved in the conflict seemed to realize this.  When the dispute did end up in court, 
either because of dissatisfaction with mediation results of lack of communication, the 
litigants probably felt a considerable amount of reluctance.  In all likelihood, they hoped 
that their social reputation and ties, even with their legal opponents, would receive as 
little damage from the legal process as possible.  This follows naturally from the overall 
preference for communal mediation, and fits in with the predominantly Confucian nature 
of Chinese social ethics.  Thus, the less adversarial, sometimes even patronizing, nature 
of Qing litigation would have been quite reassuring to litigants.  It gave off the 
impression that formal litigation was not unbearably colder and more inflexible than 
communal mediation, thereby encouraging people to use the system more readily.  
Litigation was probably still the last resort, but its triggering conditions were made easier 
by the possibility of court mediation. 
Disputes between commoners and the government followed the same logic: 
people had even more incentive to maintain good relations with authorities than with 
their neighbors.  Even when the dispute was serious enough to litigate, they probably still 
hoped that the judge would make some effort to encourage conciliation and, as much as 
possible, a mutually satisfactory result.  As argued above, extremely serious conflicts, in 
which common people had entered into a severely hostile relationship with the authorities, 
were probably quite rare, so some level of conciliation was almost always desirable.  In 
the great majority of cases, the incentives and hopes of litigants were probably quite 
comparable to civil litigation. 
While scholars have yet to systematically examine the motivations behind modern 
Chinese administrative litigation, existing studies on civil litigation suggest that the 
cultural preference for less confrontation remains quite prevalent to this day.  As Zhu Suli 
notes in his famous Song Fa Xia Xiang (Sending Law down to the Rural Areas), local 
judges are frequently forced to innovate when the formal law fails to anticipate the 
complexities of civil litigation.  When conducting such innovations, the most urgent need, 
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as recognized by both the judges and the litigants, is to “resolve the problem.”172  This is 
where mediation frequently comes in handy.  The litigants are usually not looking to 
label their opponents as “wrongdoers” or to punish them, but merely to protect their own 
interests.  In quite a few cases, the social familiarity between the two sides can actually 
lead them to desire less severe consequences for the other side.
173
  Other scholars who 
have conducted empirical research on local Chinese adjudication have frequently reached 
similar conclusions.
174
  This is, of course, entirely consistent with the cultural traditions 
that were so powerful during the Qing.  As with Qing administrative litigation, the 
enormous volume of administrative grievances people now file with either the Xinfang 
offices or the courts suggests that only a small fraction of them can be extremely serious 
conflicts in which the petitioner or litigant no longer hopes for any sort of reconciliation 
with the accused officials, especially since most petitions target local authorities who will 
continue to be an important part of local life after the conflict passes.  The lack of 
mediation and the mandatory public trial in administrative litigation can, therefore, be 
highly uncomfortable for the petitioners in less serious conflicts, when their goal is only 
to further their own interests, and not to bring down the offending authorities. 
In addition, the establishment of the people’s mediation committees in 1954 
seems to be a clear continuation of the Chinese people’s historical preference for less 
confrontational methods of dispute-resolution.  Indeed, the continued viability of these 
committees, along with the high percentage of civil disputes that end in mediation,175 
seem to be fairly strong indicators that this culture of anti-adversarialism is indeed alive 
and well, and that Zhu Suli’s observations do indeed resonate with larger-scale statistics.  
I am somewhat hesitant to label this tradition a “Confucian” tradition.  As almost 
any expert on China will agree, Confucianism’s vitality in modern China is unclear.  It is, 
of course, no longer dominant in government or academic discourse, and has indeed 
endured a prolonged period of outright attack by official propaganda.  While its place in 
everyday life and social norms is clearly different, China’s complex modern history 
makes it impossible to make any blanket statement on the “current state” of 
Confucianism.  Nevertheless, even if people no longer expressly cite Confucian texts to 
justify their dislike of confrontation, that does not mean the behavioral “habits” instilled 
in them by social and familial culture have necessarily changed beyond recognition.  A 
change in justification does not always entail a change in behavior.  In fact, if the 
behavior is entrenched deeply enough in culture and tradition, it can very easily survive 
the demise of the ideology that initially gave birth to it.  Scholars who have studied the 
influence of Christianity on Western legal traditions are surely no stranger to such cases.  
The data provided by Zhu Suli does not mean that Confucianism, as an ideology, is still 
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alive in China, but merely indicates that certain socio-legal habits it established long ago 
appear to exist even now, with or without justification through quoting the Analects. 
For all its faults and opacities, the Xinfang system offers a decidedly less 
adversarial and combative resolution process than litigation.
176
  In the fairly unlikely 
circumstance that an office accepts a petition, one of the most common responses is to 
send a “work team” (“gong zuo zu”) down to the locality where the dispute occurred and 
then attempt to resolve the conflict through informal and frequently reconciliatory means, 
usually by generating some kind of compromise.
177
  There is little doubt that these 
methods are probably more comfortable than a litigation process in which court-mediated 
reconciliation is formally impossible. 
A number of scholars have argued that, despite the formal prohibition against 
mediation in administrative litigation, courts nonetheless secretly encourage it through a 
variety of hints and urges.
178
  This is reflected in the high percentage of cases that are 
withdrawn prior to conclusion.  Yet it would be somewhat silly to expect the average 
litigant or petitioner to realize this, since even trained scholars must sort through piles of 
complicated case data to reach that conclusion.  Petitioners can be expected to conduct 
some basic research of the law and perhaps on success rates of various forms of action, 
but cannot be expected to keep up with recent academic developments.  What they see 
when they research the ALL is a litigation system that expressly bans mediation, and that, 
most likely, is what they will believe to be true in practice.  Of course, if the number of 
administrative litigants was larger, then the courts’ informal use of mediation might 
spread through word-of-mouth.  The phenomenon that this paper seeks to explain, 
however, is precisely why the volume of litigation is so low. 
Whether fear of an apparently adversarial trial process is enough to offset all the 
procedural deficiencies that are inherent in the Xinfang system is not necessarily clear, 
but there is no need to attempt a detailed evaluation.  As noted above, an irrational fear of 
or discomfort with the litigation system can easily make potential litigants prejudicially 
blind to its advantages.  Thus, although the litigation is clearly the superior option, they 
may simply be too uncomfortable to understand that.  Considering how easily our better 
judgment can be clouded by prejudice, this is by no means a far-fetched scenario. 
It may be possible to present the explanation proposed here as a more advanced 
version of the “rational choice” theory.  This would necessarily be based on the long-term 
interests of petitioners: they might value their long-term relationship with local 
authorities more than their short-term interest in resolving the dispute.  Since the 
heightened “adversarialism” of the litigation system would seem to damage that long-
term relationship more than Xinfang petitioning, petitioners are willing to bear with a 
lower chance of short-term success.  This explanation has a number of technical problems 
before it can be considered a compelling theory:  As the widespread retaliation against 
Xinfang petitioners show, local officials are quite antagonistic towards petitioning as well, 
so the benefit in long-term relationships, while probably existent, might not be extremely 
impressive.  Thus, whether this benefit is enough to overcome the drastically lower 
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success-rate of Xinfang petitioning is highly questionable.  In any case, such calculations 
of long-term versus short-term interest are exceedingly ambiguous in the first place, and 
it seems highly difficult to identify a solidly rational basis for comparison.  It is easier to 
believe that dislike of “adversarialism” had simply prejudiced petitioners against 
litigation. 
I do not intend to suggest that the ban on mediation is the only possible reason 
why the ALL has received a colder reception than the current civil litigation system or 
the Qing legal system.  There are too many historical and cultural factors that could 
influence the validity of that claim.  It is plausible, and the comparisons clearly are quite 
illuminating, but it would take at least a full book to fully consider all possible counter-
arguments.  On the other hand, a less adversarial resolution is perhaps the only positive 
aspect of the Xinfang system that administrative litigation cannot match.  We have 
demonstrated that the Xinfang system offers a much poorer chance of successful 
resolution, and that China’s legal and political history does not display a powerful enough 
“anti-litigation” tradition to explain the ALL’s immense inferiority in popularity.  Proof 
by exclusion of alternatives is crude, but, at least in our present case, it can be effective.   
 
Conclusion 
 This paper has argued that the best explanation for the Xinfang system’s superior 
popularity over administrative litigation is the latter’s inflexible and more adversarial 
procedure, which stems from its prohibitions against mediation and private trials.  While 
I have not presented a direct proof of this theory, instead stopping at demonstrating its 
potential validity and the failures of alternative explanations, the construction of a direct 
proof would be fairly straightforward.  Intuitively, it would take an extensive survey of 
Xinfang petitioners, at least as thorough as those conducted under government 
authorization in 2004, which asks them, in direct terms, why they chose the Xinfang 
system over litigation.  The failure of previous researchers to ask this question has 
seriously limited the scope of current scholarship on the Xinfang phenomenon, including 
this paper. 
  Assuming that my proposed explanation is ultimately proven as I expect, its 
ramifications would be very significant.  Most importantly, it would demonstrate the 
power of China’s cultural affinity towards mediation-based law and thus provide an 
important case study for more general cultural comparisons between Chinese law and 
western legal systems.  For policy-makers, it would also suggest that future attempts to 
increase the ALL’s popularity, if indeed they are normatively or practically desirable, 
should not necessarily focus on increasing the “legal awareness” of the general 
population.  The success of civil litigation and China’s own legal traditions suggest that a 
willingness to litigate is not lacking in Chinese culture, as long as the legal system 
satisfies certain requirements.  Thus, the main thrust of the reforms should be changing 
the ALL, not the people who will potentially use it.  Since reforming law is far easier 
than altering cultural habits or preferences, the future of administrative litigation in China 
may yet be brighter that many have assumed.  Pulling it out of the shadow of Xinfang 
petitioning might not be such a Herculean task after all. 
